NONEMPLOYEE ACCESS TO EMPLOYER
PROPERTY: A STATE OR FEDERAL SOLUTION?
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH

It has been five years since I wrote Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal
Labor Law, in which I addressed some of the problems arising from the current limits
on unions’ and other nonemployees’ ability to access employer property.1 Although
my appreciation for the issues at stake in these cases has developed during that time,
the law has largely remained static. This has put me in somewhat of an odd position,
as I find myself lamenting that my article still has relevance; I would much rather be
looking back at a piece that reforms had made obsolete. On the other hand, the lack
of reform has provided me the opportunity to engage in this discussion with Jesse
Dill.
In his article, Restoring Unions in America by Reforming Nonemployee Union
Representative Access Rights to Employer Property, Dill also confronts the nonemployee
access issue, but he takes a far different path.2 We do not differ in our view that the
current Lechmere/Babcock framework inadequately protects nonemployees’ ability to
communicate with employees on employer property.3 Yet, our approaches to reform
are diametrically opposed: I criticize the influence of state property law in federal
labor cases, while Dill seeks to increase the influence of state law.4
In distinguishing our approaches to right-to-access disputes, one must
consider two separate realities. The first, which was the focus of my article, is the
status quo. It is a world in which Lechmere remains the law, with no serious prospect
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of congressional or judicial reversal.5 It was this reality with which my article was
concerned—a reality where, in my mind, the National Labor Relations Board (the
“NLRB”) still has options for improving nonemployees’ ability to communicate with
employees at a worksite despite the limits of Lechmere.6 Dill raises objections to this
argument, but his ultimate focus is on an entirely different reality. This reality is one
in which the Supreme Court or Congress takes up reform.7 This kind of reform is
not likely in the near future, but it is certainly worth considering. Indeed, I share
Dill’s desire for a more substantive solution to Lechmere by the Supreme Court or
Congress. My belief that reform would not happen anytime soon led me to my
original argument, but I am more than happy to engage in a more optimistic exercise
and consider how such reform should occur.
Beyond this discussion on reforming nonemployee access rights is a far
broader debate. A central feature of Dill’s and my differing approaches to
nonemployee access disputes are disparate views of a much larger issue: workplace
federalism. The extent to which labor and employment law should be the province
of state or federal regulation is a topic about which I have written much recently.8
Although I do myself a disservice by summarizing my own arguments on this
complex issue in a single sentence, a major theme in my writings has been the
assertion that exclusive federal regulation of the workplace would be superior to state
jurisdiction or shared state and federal jurisdiction. Exclusive federal jurisdiction—
like the other options—is not without costs, but in most cases it is superior to the
alternatives. This idea represents a radical departure from our current system in the
United States; thus, it is no surprise that my arguments have led to stiff opposition
from those who would prefer to see more, rather than less, state governance of the
workplace.9 Dill’s article places him firmly in the camp of these opponents.
Although he is in good company, I remain unmoved by these arguments, particularly
with regard to attempts to expand nonemployees’ right to access employers’
property.
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THE L ECHMERE REALITY

A large portion of Dill’s article addresses the same world that I did, one in
which there is no legislative or judicial response to Lechmere. Under this regime, the
Supreme Court has provided employers with near-total power to exclude
nonemployees from its property, even if those nonemployees were merely trying to
inform employees of their NLRA right to engage in collective action or seek
collective representation.10 Given the NLRA’s stagnation over the last several
decades, this reality is likely to exist for quite some time.11 Indeed, even among the
few NLRA bills that reached the realm of possibility—yet still failed—an attempt to
overturn Lechmere has not been among them.12 Similarly, there is no reason to believe
that the Supreme Court will change its mind in favor of granting unions and other
nonemployees more access to private property than it did in Lechmere.
Accordingly, although both Dill and I favor statutory reform, it is important
to consider other means to address the problems of Lechmere. This inquiry prompts
the most significant differences between Dill and myself. He favors an approach
that increases the role of states, while my approach would do the opposite by seeking
to eliminate state law as much as possible from nonemployee right-to-access cases.
Both proposals have pros and cons, but the passage of time has not dissuaded me
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from the view that the enforcement of labor rights would benefit from less state
involvement, not more.
A.

A Proposal to Eliminate State Property Law from NLRA Access Cases

In my article, Taking State Property Rights out of Federal Labor Law, I addressed
an issue that has troubled many commentators: the harmful effect of Lechmere on
union organizing.13 Unlike the previous criticisms, however, I began from the
premise—albeit grudgingly—that Lechmere would not be overturned by either the
Supreme Court or Congress.14 Instead, I sought an alternative to the NLRB’s
current application of Lechmere, one that would remain valid under the Supreme
Court’s precedent, but would reduce its ill effects on union organizing.15 The article
can also be viewed, with the advantage of hindsight, as an opening salvo in a project
with which I have been engaged for the last several years. The aim of this project
has been to push for more exclusive federal control over labor and employment
regulation, and it has thankfully grown into a wide-ranging discussion with others.16
With his current piece, Dill has joined the discussion, and, like most of the
participants, he is not in my corner.
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My proposal, at its essence, was to incorporate a typical Section 8(a)(1)
analysis into nonemployee access cases.17 That is, I argued that the NLRB should
focus on the question of whether an employer’s attempt to remove nonemployees
would tend to interfere with reasonable employees’ willingness to exercise their labor
rights.18 In particular, I would treat peaceful attempts to remove nonemployees from
property that employees believe is the employer’s—no matter the actual property
rights—as presumptively lawful.19 This presumption could be rebutted by showing
special circumstances that would make reasonable employees view the removal as
coercive, such as a pattern of unlawful anti-union activity or harassment.20 In
contrast, non-peaceful attempts to remove nonemployees from what employees
believe to be employer property,21 or peaceful attempts to exclude nonemployees
from property that employees view as not being the employer’s, would be
presumptively unlawful.22
The two major purposes for my proposal were to eliminate the need for the
NLRB to rule on state property law issues, which are well beyond the agency’s
expertise, and to focus instead on the effect of exclusions on employees’ labor rights.
As I argued in my article, the current reliance on state property law has ill-served
both employees’ labor rights and the NLRB’s ability to adjudicate these disputes.23
Focusing instead on the manner in which an employer attempts to remove
nonemployee organizers eliminates the need for the NLRB to analyze state property
law. Moreover, where employers remove nonemployee organizers from most
worksites in a way that tends to chill employees’ willingness to exercise their labor
17
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rights, my proposal offers relief that is lacking under current law, as well as under
Dill’s nonlegislative proposal. That said, there are still gaps in both of our
nonlegislative proposals; for that reason, we agree that statutory reform provides the
best approach for protecting employees’ right to communicate about collective
action and representation.24
Dill levels several criticisms at my proposal. For instance, he argues that the
Section 8(a)(1) right-to-access analysis would make the NLRB’s job difficult because
it is subjective.25 That is simply not true. Like Section 8(a)(1) generally, my proposal
would center on the objective inquiry of whether the employer’s conduct in
excluding nonemployees would tend to interfere with a reasonable employee’s labor
rights.26 Employees’ subjective perceptions could serve as evidence in this objective
inquiry, but they would not be necessary.27
Similarly, Dill is concerned that my proposal would require the NLRB to
make factual and credibility determinations.28 But this is a criticism that could be
made of the entire legal system, in which virtually all cases require extensive factual
determinations. The NLRB, in particular, is well-versed in fact-finding, as the vast
majority of its cases turn on disputes over facts and various individuals’
interpretations of what happened. Indeed, if the NLRB is unable to adequately make
factual findings and credibility determinations, then its entire adjudicatory function is
in doubt. But that capability has never been seriously questioned; despite many
shortcomings with the NLRB, its ability to make factual and credibility
determinations is not among them.29 Moreover, my proposal would create relatively
24
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clear guidelines—in the form of rules of presumption—with the intent of aiding the
NLRB’s analysis of these cases.30
The irony in this criticism is that Dill’s proposals would do little to lessen the
NLRB’s fact-finding workload. In determining whether a state property right to
exclude exists, as would be required regularly under Dill’s proposals, the NLRB
would have to address factual questions about where nonemployees were standing,
what a lease stated, whether the organizers had been given permission to be in an
area, the extent to which the employer kept out other nonemployee groups, and a
host of other issues.31
Dill also expresses concern that my proposal would require separate litigation
if there were both NLRA and state trespass claims.32 The prospect of parallel state
and federal litigation is a valid concern, and one that I have addressed before.33
Unfortunately, this problem cannot be alleviated without a major change in property
law jurisdiction, as the NLRB is and has always been without power to adjudge state
trespass claims.34 Thus, Dill’s concern about parallel litigation applies equally to
L. 707, 754 (2006) (“The Board is thus distinguished from a court not only in its superior ability to
learn relevant facts.”) (quoting Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board
and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 63 (1968)).
30
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current law, as well as the law as it would exist under his proposals. Simply put, if an
employer wants to pursue a trespass claim, it will have to instigate separate state
litigation because the NLRB is wholly without authority to rule on such claims.35
This is sensible, as state property law should be decided by state courts, while federal
labor issues should be adjudicated by the NLRB.36 Given the NLRB’s lack of
jurisdiction over state property claims, not to mention its lack of expertise in the
area, it makes little sense to force the NLRB to engage in substantive rulings on state
property law.37
One weakness with my original proposal that Dill does not raise, but that has
become more apparent to me over the years, is that it did not do enough to directly
recognize the importance of communications to collective activity. The proposal
would provide such protection indirectly, but a better solution would provide more
protection for substantive nonemployee-employee communications.
Such
interaction is often necessary for employees to have the freedom to exercise their
right to collective action.38 The problem, ultimately, is that my proposal was only
intended as a second-best or stopgap measure that reflected the current law. That
law, primarily under the Court’s decision in Lechmere, is the real reason that there is
insufficient protection for workplace communications, because it views virtually any
type of communication between nonemployees and employees—no matter how
fleeting—as satisfying employees’ right to learn about collective action.39 That view

Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 355-56 n.2, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing West Virginia, California,
Hawaii, Louisiana, and New Mexico).
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is demonstrably false,40 and as Dill and I agree, the best solution is to legislatively
reverse it.41
B.

Back to the Future

Although the NLRB has the authority to modify its nonemployee access
analysis under Lechmere,42 my proposal would admittedly be an abrupt departure from
a relatively established practice. It is no surprise, therefore, that others may seek less
radical departures from the status quo. Dill’s nonlegislative proposal, however,
suffers from the opposite problem, as its main requirement would do no more than
require the NLRB to follow its current practice.43
The central argument in Dill’s proposal is that the NLRB’s Lechmere analysis
should begin with a determination whether an employer has a state property right to
exclude.44 This reform is anything but, as it merely describes the current state of
NLRB law.
Dill acknowledges that in many cases the NLRB already examines employer’s
state property interests as an initial matter.45 Yet, he decries what he characterizes as
an alternative Lechmere analysis, one in which the threshold question is solely whether
the two Babcock exceptions—no other means of access, and discrimination—apply.46
This alternative analysis is an illusion, however; in truth the NLRB and courts have
never abandoned the rule that Lechmere only applies where the employer has a state
property right to exclude.47 For instance, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly stated that
40

See Communication, supra note 10, at 25.

41

See infra pp. 29-33 and notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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As I argued in my article, the reliance on state property law seems to ignore the Supreme Court’s
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words, as long as the easy-to-satisfy alternative access concern is met, nonemployees’ derivative rights
are no longer in play.
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187 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where state law does not create [an interest allowing the
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under the NLRB’s reading of Lechmere, an “employer may, without violating § 8(a)(1),
exclude a nonemployee union representative from its property if and only if it has that
right under state law.”48
As the sole example of the alternative analysis, Dill cites a Second Circuit
decision issued subsequent to my article, Salmon Run Shopping Center LLC v. NLRB.49
It is true that the court in Salmon Run focused solely on whether one of the Babcock
exceptions applied.50 But it goes too far to suggest that the court was holding that
state property law is never an issue in nonemployee access cases. Instead, Salmon
Run is merely one of many cases—like, as Dill notes, Lechmere itself—in which the
employer’s state property right to exclude is uncontested.51 Indeed, the court in
Salmon Run noted that the only contested issue was whether the union’s invocation
of the discrimination exception was appropriate.52 Given that no party questioned
the employer’s right to exclude, it is little wonder that the court and the NLRB did
not waste time in addressing that issue.53
More generally, Dill cites no cases—and I am aware of none—in which the
NLRB has applied Lechmere in a situation in which it found that the employer lacked
a right to exclude.54 To the contrary, the NLRB, with court approval, has repeatedly
O’Neil’s Mkts. v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 733, 738–39 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Johnson & Hardin Co., 305
N.L.R.B. 690 (1991), enforced in relevant part, 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “Lechmere leaves
undisturbed previous Board holdings that an employer lacking the right to exclude others from certain
property violates section 8(a)(1) when it removes section 7 actors from those areas”)); Corp. Interiors,
Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 732, 745–49 (2003); Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 183, 185 (2001),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 39 F. App’x 730, 734 (3d Cir. 2002); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B.
437, 438 (1993).
48

Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 451 F.3d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).

49

Salmon Run Shopping Ctr., LLC v. NLRB, 534 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2008).

50

Id. at 114.

51

Dill, supra note 2, at 150. Dill also appropriately acknowledges the Court’s reliance on state
property rights when determining unions’ access rights, as stated in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200, 217 (1994). Id. at 152.
52

Salmon Run, 534 F. 3d at 114 (noting that it was reviewing a NLRB order that “rested exclusively
upon a claim of discrimination”).

53
54

See id. at 108.

See, e.g., CSX Hotels, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.3d 394, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2004); Victory Mkts., Inc., 322
N.L.R.B. 17, 20–21 (1996). Among the few times an employer will be justified in removing
nonemployees from property over which it has no right to exclude are instances where the
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reasserted its long-held view that under Lechmere, it is “beyond question” that an
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it attempts to bar nonemployee collective
activity from property over which it lacks a state right to exclude.55
Dills’ state property law proposal, therefore, is a solution looking for a
problem. More accurately, it is a proposal that would reestablish the current
problems with the NLRB’s Lechmere analysis—a status quo that both Dill and I agree
fails to adequately protect communications between nonemployees and employees.56
Thus, the question is what to do about this failure. Although largely a restatement of
current NLRB law, Dill’s proposal and its defense of the incorporation of state
property law into the Lechmere analysis raises a more general policy debate regarding
the value of shared state and federal governance over labor law.
C.

Labor Federalism

Dill’s argument in favor of increased state labor regulation joins a larger
debate about workplace federalism. I have written much on this topic and will not
rehash here the arguments for and against state regulation of the workplace.57
However, it is worth emphasizing that there are costs and benefits to each argument.
For example, as Dill implicitly recognizes, it would be desirable to have a uniform
standard for the NLRB’s analysis of nonemployee access disputes—a standard that
becomes more difficult with increased state law influence. On the other hand, if one
is concerned about increasing protection for nonemployee access, state regulation
provides an additional option, albeit one that would likely be as difficult to achieve as
more direct reform of federal labor law.
Of more importance is the central point that I have tried to make throughout
this debate, which is that we need to move away from judging workplace federalism
based on its ability to provide a specific outcome at a given point in time.58 This is
the approach that Dill and other critics have adopted. In contrast, I have argued that
we should instead focus on placing jurisdiction with the entity or entities in the best
nonemployees, for example, are blocking access to the employer’s business or causing traffic
problems. Id. However, these cases were not decided under the Lechmere analysis. Id.
55

Bristol Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 437–38; see also supra note 47.

56

Dill, supra note 2, at 130-31.

57

See Revolution, supra note 16.

58

See id.
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position to exercise it. Such a policy is most likely to provide superior regulation
over the long term.59
The danger of an outcome determinative approach is two-fold. First, it is
futile to attempt to develop a federalism approach that will consistently produce a
desired outcome. Political winds change rapidly, and there is no better example of
this phenomenon than labor law. The policy oscillations of the NLRB are well
known and make any attempt to predict what the NLRB will do in the future
impossible.60 Similar changes often occur in states as well. Therefore, expanding
state labor jurisdiction may provide employees more protection in the near term—at
least employees in a select few states61—but such an expansion may end up
undermining stronger federal enforcement in the future.62
Second, an outcome determinative approach is unprincipled and ignores
important questions of governing competence. It seems far better in the long run to
place jurisdiction with the entity that is best able to achieve labor law’s goals. The
national and international nature of the global labor market suggests that consistent
national regulation will generally be the most efficient form of labor governance.63
This is particularly true when considering the NLRB’s use of specific topics like
property law, where there are significant disparities among the states.64 To be sure,
federal enforcement is far from perfect, but we are likely to see better regulation over
59

See id.

60

See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199,
231 (2010). See generally Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37
ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985).
61

Cutting out state law admittedly has its costs, especially in the few states with more union-friendly
property law—although employees in states with less friendly laws would do worse under Dill’s
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the long term from centralized federal labor governance than decentralized state
governance—especially given states’ relative inexperience with labor law.65
The other side of this coin is that there are risks in giving the NLRB more
jurisdiction than is warranted. The NLRB’s expertise is federal labor law; forcing it
to delve deeply into other complicated areas of law, like state property law, is
demanding too much of a specialized administrative agency. As I noted in my
article, the NLRB has struggled to make sense of complex property law issues, which
is not a surprise given its expertise in federal labor law.66 Indeed, the risks associated
with expanding the NLRB’s reliance on state property law was recently underscored
in its Register-Guard decision, which addressed employer limits on electronic
communications.67
Dill appropriately criticizes Register-Guard’s substantial narrowing of the
Babcock discrimination exception.68 However, another aspect of the decision is worth
noting. In Register-Guard, the NLRB created a new rule for employer attempts to bar
use of its electronic systems and other personal property. In so doing, the NLRB
ran afoul of a basic rule of property law that should be obvious to most first-year law
students. The problem comes from the fact that, in contrast to nonemployee access
cases, the NLRB has long given employees a presumptive right to solicit for
65 Although there are exceptions, such as New York’s Public Employment Relations Board, most
states’ labor law regulation is far more limited than the NLRB’s, and some states lack any traditional
labor laws.
66
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collective action on employers’ property during nonwork time and in nonwork
areas.69 Yet the NLRB refused to extend that presumption to employee emails in
Register-Guard, concluding that employers have a greater interest over their personal
property.70 This directly conflicts with a basic property law rule: real property is
entitled to more protection, not less, than personal property.71 If the NLRB cannot
grasp such a basic rule of property law, why would we want to expand its reach into
often far more complex state property issues implicated by nonemployee access
cases?

II.

WISHFUL THINKING: THE LABOR RIGHTS ACT

One significant point upon which Dill and I agree is the need for legislation
to better protect the ability of nonemployees and employees to communicate at the
worksite. My earlier proposal was limited to a world in which Lechmere remained
valid and, as such, was admittedly an attempt at a second-best solution.72 Ideally,
legislative reform would make my proposal unnecessary.
Dill’s proposed legislative response is his “Labor Rights Act” (LRA), which
would guarantee that all individuals, including nonemployees, have a right to use an
employer’s public accommodations free from discrimination based on labor
viewpoints.73 Although possibly an improvement on the status quo, the proposal
does not go far enough. Indeed, a fair reading of the LRA’s terms would actually
provide less protection for certain nonemployee communications than exists under
current law.
First, the proposed LRA seems to narrow protection for nonemployees in
69
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many situations. By limiting its application to areas of public accommodation, there
is an implication that attempts to access non-public employer property are wholly
without protection—a significant problem given that many employers provide no
public access to their worksites.
Second, even if the LRA is intended as an additional protection for public
workplaces that would exist along with the Lechmere framework, it is still questionable
whether it would do much to advance nonemployees’ ability to communicate on
employer property. This is because the LRA, on its face, does not provide any more
protection than current law. Even under Lechmere, employers cannot bar
nonemployee solicitations in a discriminatory fashion. The question, of course, is
how to define “discrimination.” Dill’s proposal does not clarify the term, thereby
leaving it in the first instance to the NLRB. There is generally nothing wrong with
leaving such interpretations to the NLRB; however, this failure to provide a more
specific definition would do nothing to address the problems with the NLRB’s
interpretation of discrimination under Register-Guard.74 Both Dill and I agree that this
definition is unjustifiably narrow, thus the LRA proposal would benefit from a
clearer and broader interpretation of discrimination.
More important, legislative reform of nonemployee access should not be
restricted to situations that involve discriminatory bars to access. The importance of
communications between nonemployees and employees exists no matter the
employer’s motivation in trying to stop such communications.75 Accordingly, true
reform would seek to ensure some level of nonemployee access in most instances,
balanced against employers’ property and business interests.
One need not look far for this reform, as an appropriate standard has existed
for 75 years: the Republic Aviation rule.76 Although the rule has been limited to
74
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employee communications, there is no reason why a modified version cannot apply
to nonemployees as well. For instance, the new rule could create a presumption that
employers must allow nonemployees some access to a worksite for the purposes of
communicating with employees. Employers would have the opportunity to rebut
that presumption, such as by showing that the requested access would be unduly
disruptive or that special business concerns necessitated unusual limits on access.
The result would likely be a NLRB-developed norm that would generally permit
unions and other nonemployees some degree of access to employer property in areas
and during times in which employees arrive and leave.77 Consequently, the rule
would substantially expand nonemployees’ ability to communicate with employees,
including at worksites that do not generally allow public access.78

III.

CONCLUSION

Nonemployees’ ability to access a worksite to communicate with employees
is a significant issue in labor law.79 Such communications are often a prerequisite to
the core right of the NLRA: the ability of employees to choose whether to engage in
collective action.80 As Dill and I agree, the status quo following Lechmere falls
woefully short of providing the access needed for employees to truly enjoy this right.
How to address that shortcoming is where we differ.
Despite opposition from Dill and others, I remain convinced that expanding
states’ role in enforcing labor law is the wrong approach. Although certain states
would expand access, many others would not, and the overall effect would be to
further complicate an already complex analysis. A better solution would be to reduce
77
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the reliance on state law, whether through my proposed rule or—even better—
federal legislation that overturned Lechmere. This legislation, however, must provide
broad access, including access to property that is not typically accessible to the
public. It is only by giving employees at virtually all worksites the opportunity to
communicate with nonemployees that the right to collective action will have any
relevance for most employees.

